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Abstract 
The existence of a global nuclear order as a 
conglomeration of norms, regimes, and institutions seems 
to have brought equilibrium to the governance of the 
Atom. Yet, the „order‟ is dominated by the non-
proliferation norm, which has curbed the spread of 
nuclear weapons though not their existence. The NPT, as 
the cornerstone treaty, to facilitate this process has 
faltered due to its incoherent conceptual framing and 
conflicting interpretations of its process and purpose. The 
goal of total elimination, however, has remained elusive. 
This article revisits the early struggles of nuclear norm 
construction through the perspective of an actor with 
multiple role identities such as a norm entrepreneur, 
crusader, and challenger.  
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1. Introduction 
What was the purpose to be served by the existence of a global 
nuclear order? The general perceptions are that it should 
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encompass a global architecture of regimes and institutions that 
could bring equilibrium, balance and sanity to the manner in which 
the affairs of the Atom are managed or governed. At a more 
specific level, one could conceive of rules, norms, instruments and 
structures that could work for a particular set of objectives, which, 
in this case, could be among the following: (a) inhibit the further 
spread of nuclear weapons and establish control over the 
technology to prevent its diffusion, (b) expand the civilian and 
peaceful potential of the Atom, and (c) move towards a world 
without nuclear weapons.  
Irrespective of the nature of its evolution – be it power-centric, 
norm-oriented or security-driven, the global nuclear order 
symbolised the pursuit of these goals, singularly or in combination, 
though none of them was effectively fructified. Notwithstanding its 
early nascent formation through efforts to consolidate nuclear 
deterrence equations between the superpowers, an actual 
semblance of „order‟ came about when multilateral consensus 
evolved to institutionalise the management of multiple applications 
of the Atom. Though an altruistic vision of promoting civilian 
nuclear energy was expounded as a rationale for the early 
initiatives, the key stimulant seemed to be the advent and threat of 
more states accessing the nuclear weapons technology. The 
fundamental impulse behind Eisenhower‟s Atom-for-Peace (1953), 
and the earlier attempt of the Baruch Plan (1946) could have been 
the aim or interest of the then nuclear powers to monopolise this 
technology and restrict its access. They executed the same through 
their bargain of promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy to those 
nations that were willing to forego the right to develop nuclear 
weapons.  
The establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was the first step towards an institutional mechanism to 
implement this bargain, but also laid the foundations of a regime, 
whose identity and objectives, however, was mired in conceptual 
confusion. In the intervening years between the 1950s and 1960s, 
the narratives on nuclear annihilation and halting the spread of 
nuclear weapons had germinated various approaches, including 
non-dissemination and non-acquisition, on the one hand (as a 
means to control or inhibit access to this technology), and 
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disarmament, total elimination and abolition on the other (as path 
towards a world without nuclear weapons). The struggle between 
these approaches defined the shaping of the nuclear order, and the 
regime, in the formative years. 
A reflection of this phenomenon is the composition of various 
platforms that came up under the auspices of the United Nations, 
including the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) with the 
agenda of building global consensus on „agreeable‟ end objectives 
and their contributing structures.1 
Though disarmament was a recurring theme that influenced the 
early agenda of these forums, the intensifying Cold War rivalries 
between the two blocs made it difficult to find a common ground 
on the means towards this end. An example of this trend was the 
McCloy-Zorin talks which produced a US-Soviet Joint Statement on 
Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (1961) but failed 
to gather traction as the superpowers could not agree on a common 
draft for a disarmament treaty.2 On the other hand, the increase in a 
number of states attaining the capability to develop nuclear 
weapons, and the challenges of opening access to nuclear energy 
resources for all nations prompted the need for effective control 
and oversight over nuclear resources. 
These impulses drove a marginal level of bloc cooperation to devise 
structures against wider dissemination of nuclear weapons 
technology although competing alliance politics delayed consensus 
on several of these proposed measures. Ireland‟s draft resolutions 
(1959-61) calling for steps to stop the transfer of nuclear weapons or 
technology and undertaking by non-weapon states not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons were among the early initiatives in 
this direction.3 However, much of the deliberations till 1965, when 
debate began on a non-proliferation treaty, continued to be on the 
phases of a potential disarmament treaty, timelines for reductions 
and progressing to a comprehensive test ban treaty, among others, 
which highlighted the divergences on the feasible route to 
disarmament though also opening the prospects for a global 
framework to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.4 




The turnaround towards a „non-proliferation‟ treaty was propelled 
by many factors:  
(a) Despite the impetus for arms reductions, events like the Cuban 
Missile Crisis diminished possibilities of détente and fuelled the 
disinclination of superpowers‟ to curtail arsenals or restrict their 
augmentation.  
(b) The Chinese nuclear test of October 1964 aggravated the 
security environment for many non-weapon states, mainly India, 
who demanded a comprehensive treaty that included not just 
disarmament and non-dissemination measures but also the 
elimination of existing arsenals and security guarantees against the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed states.  
(c) The expansion of nuclear energy carried the inherent risk of 
misuse and diversion, which need an effective instrument that 
could inhibit the ability of states to proliferate. Further, the bargain 
of accessing nuclear energy resources in return for abstaining from 
the pursuit of nuclear weapons - needed to be formalised through a 
legal framework, which could ideally include total elimination as a 
long-term end objective.  
2. NPT: A Circumstantial Treaty  
The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), 
which was adopted by the UNGA through Resolution 2373 (XXII) 
on 12 June 1968, is treated as the cornerstone of the non-
proliferation regime and has defined and shaped the nuclear order 
since its creation. Over the years, the treaty has evolved into a near-
universal framework of non-proliferation with only four hold-outs, 
and the remaining, including those that voted against or abstained 
on Resolution 2373, subsequently joining the treaty. The treaty has 
accomplished the task of enforcing a global norm against the spread 
of nuclear weapons, though not a norm against nuclear weapons as 
such or facilitating measures towards eventual elimination. The 
NPT, though, was by no means an ideal instrument, and in turn, 
had emerged out of a flawed norm construction process – the 
impetus to find the means to eliminate nuclear weapons ended up 
formalising its possession in the hands of a few while prohibiting 
its pursuit by the rest.  
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The treaty propounded a grand bargain: halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons with the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) not 
acquiring or manufacturing them, while the recognised nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) take measures to progress towards 
disarmament even as all countries benefit from uninterrupted 
access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The treaty is, thus, 
supposed to be resting on three pillars: non-proliferation, 
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet, can the 
three pillars co-exist in complementary roles when one of them 
prevails as the operational framework, another as an envisioned 
end-goal and the third remaining as a corollary? Put differently, 
can they have an egalitarian existence with one pillar (non-
proliferation) dominating over the other two, by exercising control 
over another (peaceful uses of nuclear energy) even while its 
functional motto is to facilitate progress towards the third 
(disarmament). This imbalance strikes at the core of the three-pillar 
theory, and in turn illustrates why the treaty has ended up as an 
instrument to establish the non-proliferation norm, control access 
to nuclear energy resources, and only conceives of preferable 
conditions to move towards disarmament.  
This complexity embodies not just a flawed process but also the 
structural deficiencies that shaped the nuclear order in the 1960s: 
(a) the superpowers held nuclear weapons as a currency of power 
and hegemony which drove their aversion to any disarmament 
instrument or provisions that could impinge their arsenals; (b) 
despite active participation in the ENDC debate by many members 
of both blocs, and supporting arguments of the non-aligned group, 
their eventual choice was to bandwagon with their bloc leaders; (c) 
non-proliferation emerged as a circumstantial formula, not an 
inevitable outcome of ENDC negotiations, as the superpowers had 
to manoeuvre a treaty draft that adopted some demands of the 
NNWS but none that affected their strategic calculations; (d) the 
„hurried‟ adoption of „non-proliferation‟ as the guiding theme or 
philosophy of the NPT, in their effort to stymie the disarmament 
provisions, led to its incoherent conceptual framing. The resultant 
incongruities, which were causal for many systemic problems that 
confronted the treaty and translated into crises for the regime and 
the order, could be encapsulated on the following lines. 




3. Non-Proliferation – As a Means or an End? 
Can the twin goals of disarmament and non-proliferation go 
together? Rather, was non-proliferation the way the NPT conceived 
it actually designed to lead towards disarmament? It has become 
customary for observers of the non-proliferation system to cite 
unfavourable conditions in the global security environment as 
having stymied the progress towards disarmament or effective 
pursuit of Article VI. Yet, the NWS rarely seemed inclined to 
discard their nuclear arsenals completely, owing to their security 
dilemmas or competition and also because their great power status 
hinges on its possession. More significant, though, is the inchoate 
manner in which non-proliferation was conceptualised. Non-
proliferation was an idea that caught the imagination of both 
sections - the NWS saw it as an opportunity to inhibit the 
emergence of newer weapon powers while the NNWS felt the 
concept covered all aspects of proliferation including vertical and 
horizontal proliferation. An agreement on non-proliferation was 
thus expected to be a durable means towards disarmament.  
However, the manner in which the treaty was drafted without 
defining its fundamental concepts and the imbalance inbuilt into its 
framework are a testament to the fact that the NPT was more of a 
political instrument – a result of rare superpower bonhomie driven 
by their common interests – and by no means a creative norm 
building exercise.  
In the political din of negotiations, no attempt was made to define 
non-proliferation or its end objectives, nor enshrining how a 
sustained effort at non-proliferation is actually going to lead to 
disarmament. In other words, the treaty does not enunciate 
whether non-proliferation is a means towards disarmament or an 
end in itself. As a result, two conflicting approaches have been 
expounded by different sections: (a) non-proliferation was to 
establish a global framework to inhibit the further spread of 
nuclear weapons and technology alongside a series of incremental 
measures, pursued in a parallel and phased manner, and leading to 
a disarmament process through a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament; and (b) non-proliferation could facilitate the progress 
towards a tipping point – a post-proliferation world - from where 
proliferation no longer happens and sets the conditions for a 
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disarmament instrument to be initiated. Both these approaches 
have not achieved traction beyond a point of stasis with their paths 
often overlapping, leading to a stalemate and recurring crisis.  
Non-proliferation as a concept throws up multiple dimensions. 
When taken per se as a nomenclature, non-proliferation could 
innately connote an end – as a mitigation point of proliferation or no 
more proliferation. However, its perceived conception is of a means – 
as enduring measures to ensure that states do not proliferate and 
enable progress towards disarmament and total elimination. The 
uninhibited pursuit of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and early 
1960s and resultant clamour for disarmament had influenced the 
NPT negotiations to the extent that the superpowers had to project 
non-proliferation as a means to an end -the promise of a world with 
no more proliferation or when states no longer pursue nuclear 
weapons. On an ideal course, this concept should have been a 
process which starts as a means and culminates as an end. In its 
expandable manifestations, the treaty has institutionalised non-
proliferation as the means to pursue three ends: (1) mitigate 
possibilities of nuclear weapons proliferation, (2) optimal usage of 
nuclear energy without risk of proliferation, and (3) facilitate a 
post-proliferation world that will create conditions for 
disarmament and total elimination. However, this postulation 
could be challenged as the goal of a post-proliferation world is not 
sanctified in the NPT, and in reality seems to be tall order for two 
reasons: (a) disarmament could be delayed until this condition is 
achieved, and (b) such a scenario may be forever elusive. 
The NPT preamble does not suggest the possibility of a post-
proliferation world. It though describes an ideal scenario which 
could be akin to such a condition - an earliest possible date when 
nuclear arms race ceases to exist, all test explosions are 
discontinued, international tension eases and trust is strengthened. 
Such a scenario, the preamble conceives, could facilitate the 
cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, liquidation of all 
stockpiles and elimination of national arsenals, though only 
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Though 
many of these conditions are unlikely to be met in the foreseeable 
future, over the years, votaries of disarmament have assumed that 
a treaty for this purpose could be negotiated concurrently and 




preferably by the 25-year timeline when the treaty was to be 
reviewed for extension. It is noteworthy that Article X (2) does not 
entail the termination of the treaty at this point, thus connoting that 
the search for a post-proliferation world or a stand-alone 
disarmament instrument could be infinite. 
4. The End-Objectives 
What then is the end objective of the treaty, and what it implies for 
the nuclear order? The NPT does not solemnise a single-point 
objective – of a world without nuclear weapons. Instead, its 
preamble conceives the formulation of an agreement on the 
prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, which will be 
complemented by measures to promote nuclear energy within the 
framework of IAEA safeguards. The prudent management of 
nuclear resources through these measures should enable state-
parties to cooperate for effective measures in the direction of nuclear arms 
disarmament, along with the cessation of the arms race. The progress 
towards this stage should lead to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament (NPT).  
When read together, it may seem that the treaty demands a set of 
actions that will naturally culminate in a disarmament treaty. In 
practice, though, the preamble defines the treaty as a 
conglomeration of measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons 
and, by consequence, create ideal conditions for disarmament. 
Whether disarmament will ultimately remove nuclear weapons 
will be a matter of practical realisation, of how the technology or 
know-how is going to be controlled thereafter. Nonetheless, the 
absence of an enshrined objective of total elimination and a 
designated timeframe to achieve it leaves the NPT open-ended and 
destined for eternity.  
What the NPT text omits, though, is emphatically included in the 
1995 Extension Conference resolution. Decision 3 states that: 
“Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty...its extension and 
universal adherence are essential to... the attainment of the ultimate 
goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament...”. By affirming that the ultimate 
goal is a disarmament treaty and total elimination, Decision 3 
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implies the timeline to fulfill this goal may be indeterminable. The 
global nuclear order may, in the meantime, remain as an enduring 
system to pursue this goal. Its actual utility, though, will be in 
managing residual applications of the Atom, which will be a 
functionality that may surpass the goal of total elimination. For, the 
normative management of nuclear energy will require a 
dependable set of global governance systems for the infinite future.   
5. The Power-Hegemonic Influence 
The ENDC produced not just a cornerstone treaty to anchor the 
non-proliferation regime, but also reinforced the hegemonic 
influence over the international system and the power-centric 
impulses of the nuclear order. Since the espousal of the atoms-for-
peace plan, the world has been divided into nuclear „haves‟ and 
„have-nots‟, with the NPT formalising this condition. That the final 
NPT text was a US-Soviet joint draft is only a further illustration of 
the fact that the superpowers framed the rules of the game. Their 
joint-draft did not address the key demand of the NNWS for a 
balanced and non-discriminatory treaty nor were they willing to be 
subjected to any proposals that affected their arsenals or strategic 
supremacy. Two notable examples are: (a) the treaty completely 
disavowing the principles of UNGA Resolution 2028 of 19 
November 1965, based on a joint memorandum of eight non-
aligned nations, and (b) rejection of the Fanfani proposal for a 
partial non-proliferation treaty - wherein nuclear powers cease 
production of nuclear weapons and begin reductions in the first 
stage, followed by a comprehensive treaty with undertaking by 
NNWS not to acquire or manufacture them.5 
Despite a major section of the NNWS terming the US-Soviet draft 
as promoting a fragile non-proliferation instrument, the 
superpowers were clear that the aim of the treaty should be to 
check the further spread of nuclear weapons and hence tying up 
non-proliferation to other measures could cause an impasse. 
Eventually, the allurement of accessing nuclear energy resources 
and the threat of a deadlock was effectively exploited to get 95 
states to vote in favour of the treaty, while only 4 voted against 
with the remaining 20 abstaining. Despite the wide endorsement of 
the treaty‟s flaws, the dominant sentiment was that having a treaty 




was better than having none and that no agreement on 
disarmament was possible without an agreement to prevent further 
spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, state-parties had different 
perceptions of the utility of the treaty: only a few NNWS had 
perceived it as a genuine means towards complete disarmament 
while a large section had assumed it as a guarantee against 
potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by their rivals or 
neighbours, even as most saw it as a durable framework to enable 
access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Horovitz, 2015). 
Despite its flawed construction, the treaty gave a philosophical and 
normative construct to the global nuclear order and completed the 
first phase of its evolution from the post-war years to a period of 
détente. The superpower bonhomie that facilitated the treaty‟s 
creation anchored an arms control culture that fuelled major 
initiatives for reductions and nuclear restraint. More importantly, 
the NPT exemplified how power and interests decisively shaped 
the mechanisms of the international system, irrespective of the 
collective security principles that drove their creation or the 
normative values behind their conception. The instruments of the 
regime have since been largely controlled by the hegemon (US) and 
a group of guardians (mostly of the liberal security community), 
who have determined the nature and shape of the collective 
security institutions that emerge from time to time.6 Almost all 
normative structures and paradigmatic shifts invariably suit the 
interests of this group, whose leverage is determined by their 
power and/or economic and technological capabilities.  
Even when viewed from a constructivist „learning‟ and „schooling‟ 
paradigm, it is clear that the hegemon and the guardians have 
predominantly determined the norms of international nuclear 
behaviour, with the rest having to adjust their policies to their 
benchmarks. The NPT, though, could be an insightful case in 
explaining the process of norm-construction: how a disparate 
group of norm-entrepreneurs constructed a norm against spread of 
nuclear weapons, and cascaded it through a treaty, which was 
subsequently internalised by the vast section of state-parties who 
acceded in the years to come, through socialisation and incentives 
(Finnemore, 1998). The intense polemics at the NPT negotiations, 
followed by the decisive swing in favour of the resolution are all 
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apt examples of the learning and socialisation process that were 
initiated for this normative cycle. Similarly, this process also 
witnessed remarkable levels of norm contestation and advent of a 
new genre of actors beyond the scope of entrepreneurship, who 
consistently resisted the new norm, sought innovations or norm 
change during its construction phases. The Indian record is 
peculiar in this respect - first in crusading for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons and the activism it undertook in shaping various 
functional and normative structures, and eventually going on to 
resisting them for their „discriminatory‟ character and effeteness in 
fulfilling the perceived goals. 
6. India and the NPT: From Crusader to Challenger 
India‟s participation in the formative years of the nuclear order and 
its contribution to the normative process traversed multiple role 
identities - of a crusader, a norm entrepreneur and eventually as a 
challenger and outlier – covering decadal phases of India‟s nuclear 
diplomacy from 1954 to 1974. The first phase in the 1950s was an 
era of Nehruvian internationalism and idealism – marked by 
activism on nuclear disarmament and advocating the cause of the 
third world in the evolving nuclear order. Jawaharlal Nehru‟s 
proposal of 1954 for a „standstill agreement‟ to halt atmospheric 
testing also included the earliest calls for ceasing nuclear weapons 
production and for total elimination.7 India was an active 
contributor to the atoms-for-peace debate and establishment of the 
IAEA, especially in representing the interests of the have-nots in its 
board of governors and raising concerns on the intrusive nature of 
safeguards. It was, however, the ideational vision of a grand 
disarmament instrument that shaped India‟s initial positions when 
various proposals were being debated, in search of an elusive 
treaty.  
The second phase began with the Chinese nuclear test of October 
1964, which led to the emergence of a pro-bomb lobby in the 
country. The country‟s leadership was faced with the predicament 
of having to decide between the Nehruvian ideals and realistic 
options to secure its national interest. India‟s role as a norm-
entrepreneur took shape during this phase when, along with other 
non-aligned members, it sought to influence the ENDC agenda by 




placing security guarantees for non-weapon states along with 
tangible progress towards disarmament as the key attributes of a 
potential treaty. The Indian representative introduced 
„proliferation‟ in the lexicon of the debate (before the treaty took the 
non-proliferation turn) besides authoring joint memorandum with 
eight NAM countries to facilitate Resolution 2028.8 
The third phase was of resistance, which began in 1967 when the 
US-Soviet joint draft was shaping up. India (and Brazil) was at the 
forefront to resist the draft for being imbalanced and 
discriminatory, and for heaping prohibitions on the NNWS while 
the nuclear powers sought to legitimise their arsenals. The absence 
of security guarantees in the treaty text and the restrictions on 
PNEs were among the core issues that fed India‟s resistance. With 
the increasing number of Chinese nuclear tests and pressure 
intensifying for a domestic weapon programme, the leadership had 
few options but to reject the final draft and promise „measures to 
safeguard India‟s security‟. Around the time the NPT opened for 
signature, India decided on an active nuclearisation mission, based 
on the Vikram Sarabhai plan, which entailed the building of a 
proactive nuclear infrastructure (complemented by space and 
electronics sectors) to anchor a self-reliant nuclear energy 
programme, while also providing the wherewithal for a 
weaponisation mission, if and when the need arises.9 Eventually, 
India undertook a PNE in May 1974 and had remained as an outlier 
in the years to come. 
The decision to reject the NPT and conduct the PNE denotes not 
just raising a challenge to the way in which the nuclear order was 
being shaped by the superpowers. Despite placing disarmament as 
its core ideational objective, India was concerned about the 
implications of nuclear weapons being introduced in its 
neighbourhood, and could not accept a treaty limiting its options to 
deal with this challenge. India‟s NPT decision seems to be an 
outcome of this peculiar dichotomy – of wanting a disarmament 
end-goal but not at the expense of its security. An underlying 
conflict was seemingly at work with the leadership caught between 
its ideological commitments and the pressure of policy realism to 
keep all its options open. Between June 1965 and January 1967, 
India had lost the window of undertaking a nuclear test and 
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qualifying as a nuclear weapon state, due to the ill-informed 
judgment of how the strategic environment was evolving or how 
the treaty was shaping up, while also being handicapped by its 
principled position against nuclear weapons. The subsequent 
course to an independent standing was influenced by three 
intricate issues:  
(a) Orthodoxy on disarmament: In the final days of negotiations, New 
Delhi had stated that India will only accept a treaty that included 
credible disarmament obligations. The leadership had hoped that 
the treaty would emerge as a strong instrument of disarmament 
and would enable it to maintain its ideational status, without 
having to change the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. 
There were a handful of reasons for India‟s lack of confidence on 
the NPT as a vehicle for disarmament. First, China was neither a 
party to the NPT negotiations nor committed to acceding to the 
treaty. Any disarmament process, hence, would not cover the 
fledging Chinese arsenal as long as Beijing stayed away. Second, 
the ability of the NPT to facilitate disarmament was in question as 
there were no provisions for the liquidation of stockpiles or for 
incremental steps like a test ban and a production freeze for fissile 
materials. India rejected the preamble as mere pious declarations 
and doubted the legal validity of Article VI to pursue disarmament 
in good faith. Third, India felt that arsenals are only likely to grow 
rather than being eliminated with the intensifying arms race, which 
may give little scope for good-faith negotiations to realistically 
happen.  
(b) Security guarantees: India rejected UNSCR 255 of 19 June 1968 
(providing assurance to NNWS against the threat of nuclear 
aggression) with a pontifical assertion that „real security comes 
through disarmament‟. This position was the outcome of India‟s 
complicated approach: on the one hand, it wanted the nuclear 
powers to institutionalise guarantees through the NPT, and on the 
other, it negotiated with the superpowers in an attempt to seek 
assurances on the Chinese threat. A series of interactions –from 
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri‟s meeting with British premier 
Harold Wilson and L.K. Jha‟s mission to Moscow and Washington 
were undertaken to explore a broad security guarantee 
framework.10 While the Shastri mission ended up in confusion as 




his own ministers questioned the validity of seeking a „nuclear 
umbrella‟ from superpowers and its implications for India‟s non-
alignment policy. On the other hand, Moscow proposed a 
guarantee through the UNSC route if India signed the NPT – a 
formula that the Johnson administration also endorsed.11 
Eventually, India rejected the UNSC route and insisted on 
guarantees being enshrined in the NPT text. As a matter of fact, the 
leadership doubted if strategic interests would allow the nuclear 
powers to fulfill these guarantees, whether there would be 
immediate reprisal from the nuclear powers in the event of a 
nuclear attack, and whether such guarantees would „deter‟ China.  
(c) Peaceful nuclear explosions: India had profoundly resisted the US 
proposal of offering PNE technology on „commercial‟ basis by 
terming it as an “atomic commercial super-monopoly” and “atomic 
apartheid” (ENDC).  India‟s approach to PNEs though has been 
inconsistent. On the one hand, India made a strong distinction 
between PNEs as peaceful applications and all other forms of 
nuclear testing, which it sought to be banned. On the other, India 
made only broad references to its application for developmental 
projects. In the meantime, Shastri was known to have sanctioned 
the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Program (SNEP), on the lines 
of the US Plowshares. There are records of US officials 
recommending the sharing of this technology with India. The 
Indian government, though, was non-committal until 1972 on PNE 
experimentations pursued by the Department of Atomic Energy 
(DAE). It was not until 1974 that various articulations on its 
applications were being formally made.12 Though the actual 
reasons are still unclear on why the PNE was undertaken four 
years after the NPT entered into force, Raja Ramana talks of Indira 
Gandhi decreeing that “the experiment should be carried out for 
the simple reason that India required such a demonstration” 
(Ramanna, 1991). It may seem that the PNE was not just a 
demonstration of capability (with a weapon dimension), but also 
an effort to signal its determination to pursue a nuclear future on 
its own terms, by departing from the normative framework 
established by the NPT and the nuclear order.  




The formation of the nuclear order and its key structures shows the 
levels to which great powers can cooperate in a system of anarchy 
and self-help to construct collective security instruments that cater 
to their common interests. The relative success in maintaining 
„order‟ in the nuclear realm and governing varied applications of 
the Atom could be attributed to this camaraderie. Despite the 
inherent imbalances and engrafted discrimination, the guardians of 
the order had largely managed to mitigate the „nth‟ nuclear-armed 
nation, restrict proliferation risks to the minimum and maintain a 
universal framework of oversight and accountability. Yet, much of 
these accomplishments seemed to be guided by the convergence of 
national interests and the urge to maintain status quo of preserving 
the closed nuclear club, controlling access to nuclear commerce 
based on their own guidelines and economic-technological gains, 
and maintain a deterrence-based security architecture that retains 
the primacy of nuclear weapons.  
The endurance of the nuclear order is dependent on the non-
proliferation regime, which has faltered on the weaknesses of the 
cornerstone treaty. Though many challenges have been addressed 
through new instruments and paradigmatic shifts, the NPT has slid 
into a perennial crisis owing to the conflict between its pillars and 
competing objectives. In recent years, many voices are demanding 
progress towards the original goal of total elimination, through 
stand-alone instruments. A new paradigm is being offered by 
highlighting the „humanitarian consequences‟ of nuclear weapons. 
That these initiatives have not gained much traction could be proof 
of how power dynamics continue to drive the system, as also the 
divergent perceptions on the raison d'être of the nuclear order.   
The Indian case underscores the inevitability of normative 
contestation and how states could resist a norm construction cycle 
if it disagrees with its inherent biases or seek normative 
innovations to change the status quo. The Indian resistance also 
highlights the fact that norm construction need not be perceived as 
an altruistic endeavour, which could naturally attract adherence, 
and hence will be subjected to the dynamics of power balancing 
and dissent. The efforts to internalize a new norm, hence, entail a 




strenuous path of socialisation which involves learning and 
incentives, as also coercion. That many states took years to accede 
to the treaty is a testament to the kind of internalisation struggles 
that define this landscape. Also, the prevalence of nuclear-capable 
hold-outs, howsoever small in number, and their ability to 
challenge the normative order through acts of deviance is a 
testament to the challenges that even a power-centric order could 
occasionally be subjected to. The urge to develop an alternative 
norm-oriented order could decisively disturb the status quo.  
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End Notes 
                                                          
1 The UNDC was established by General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) on 
11 January 1952 to devise disarmament measures. Through Resolution 
1252 D (XIII) of 4 November 1958, the Commission was reconstituted 
to comprise all UN members, and last met in 1960. The ENDC was 
announced on 13 December 1961, and endorsed by Resolution 1722 
(XVI) of 20 December 1961. Members included Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UAR., UK, with US and USSR as 
its Permanent Co-chairmen.  
2 The US and Soviet delegations initiated the Zorin-McCloy talks that led 
to a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament 
Negotiations in September 1961. See text of Joint Statement on Agreed 
Principles at: https://disarmament-library.un.org/UNODA/ 
Library.nsf/1cf71faffad96cd38525796500789846/d0276def8b6fad0f8525
7a130054e158/$FILE/A-4879.pdf, accessed in June 2015. 
3 Ireland submitted drafts on „non-dissemination‟ and for measures 
against „relinquishing control or transferring information on nuclear 
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weapons manufacturing‟ in 1959 and 1960, but were opposed on each 
occasion by one of the superpowers. 
4 While the Soviets suggested a four-year period of reductions and 
disarmament, the US talked of a phased programme wherein the first 
stage of a three-year period will be used to freeze production of 
nuclear weapons, the second stage to make major inroads into 
stockpiles and the third for total elimination. 
5The five principles included: (a) the treaty should be void of any loopholes 
which might permit states to proliferate; (b) it should embody acceptable 
balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations; (c) the treaty should be a 
step towards general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear 
disarmament; (d) there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure 
its effectiveness; and (e) it should not adversely affect the right to conclude 
regional treaties to ensure total absence of nuclear weapons in respective 
territories.The joint memorandum on non-proliferation (ENDC/158) 
was submitted to the 233rd meeting of UNGA by Brazil, Burma, 
Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab 
Republic.  
6 The Liberal Security Community (LSC), according to Glenn Chafetz, is a 
group of liberal democracies with common security interests, and 
shared political and economic values, who control the affairs of the 
nuclear order, for detail see Glenn Chafetz, “The Political Psychology 
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” The Journal of Politics, 
57(3), August 1995. 
7 Jawaharlal Nehru made this proposal in the Lok Sabha on 10 May 1954, 
which was forwarded to the UN Secretary General in a letter (DC/44 
and Corr.1).  
8 V.C. Trivedi at ENDC meeting P.V.174, 12 March 1964. Also, in a letter to 
the UN Secretary General dated 10 October 1964, Indian envoy, B.N. 
Chakravarthi, requested that an item entitled „Non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons‟ be inscribed in the agenda for the Nineteenth session 
of the UNGA. 
9 Sarabhai plan reproduced in Special Issue of IDSA Journal, Vol. 3 (1) July 
1970. 
10Memorandum of Conversation, President Johnson with L.K. Jha, B.K. 
Nehru, V. Sarabhai and W.W. Rostow, Washington, 19 April 1967, 
Foreign Relations of the United States (XXV), South Asia, Document 
440. Also see telegram from Special Assistant to President Johnson, 
Document 438, and Notes by L.K. Jha to the Prime Minister‟s 




                                                                                                                                    
Secretariat, P.N. Haksar Papers, IIIrdInstallment, Subject File No. 111, 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. 
11Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Dean Rusk and Foreign 
Minister Gromyko, 23 June 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States 
1964-68 (XI), Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 198. 
12 In a Working Paper presented at the Divonne meeting organised by the 
Arms Control Association and Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 9-11 September, 1974, V.C. Trivedi talks about the broad PNE 
applications that India envisages. 
